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This paper examines the currency manipulation policy in the foreign exchange
markets of thirteen emerging countries using a structural vector autoregressive
(SVAR) framework to link the dynamics of real exchange rates and foreign reserves.
It is found that for Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan, exchange rate shocks are the
main source of ﬂuctuations in foreign reserves over all time horizons. Empirical ev-
idence suggests that these countries intervene substantially in the foreign exchange
markets in order to promote export competitiveness.
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11 Introduction
As international capital markets become more integrated, a currently fashionable view
of the choice of exchange rate regime is that countries must choose between one of two
extremes, either a free-ﬂoating or a ﬁrmly ﬁxed regime. This bipolar proposition is referred
to as the vanishing intermediate regime, or the missing middle. It is argued that the 1997
Asian currency crisis supported this proposition, since most Asian countries that suﬀered
from the currency crisis adopted either a free-ﬂoating regime (e.g., Indonesia, Korea, the
Philippines, and Thailand) or a hard peg (Malaysia) following the crisis. However, some
observers have noted that many countries that say that they allow their exchange rate to
ﬂoat do not. For instance, Calvo and Reinhart (2002) ﬁnd that the average for countries
claiming an independently ﬂoating system lies far from the benchmark and is very close
to the average for managed-ﬂoat countries. They refer to these ﬁndings as a “fear of
ﬂoating.”
Exchange rate stability is still a major policy concern because of the high pass-through
from exchange rate movements to domestic inﬂation in developing countries (see Calvo
and Reinhart (2002)). Moreover, since developing countries rely heavily on primary com-
modity exports, it is not surprising that most developing countries may adopt a managed-
ﬂoating exchange rate regime. Particularly, in order to prevent their competitiveness from
deteriorating, some emerging market economies have intervened in foreign exchange mar-
kets to prevent or slow the appreciation of their currencies. It is now referred as “currency
manipulation” (see Neely (2011)), which intends to gain an advantage in trade, and has
raised hot debate among international policymakers and analysts. Just before the G20
Seoul meeting in September 2010, Brazilian ﬁnance minister Guido Mantega spoke of an
“international currency war” where devaluing currencies artiﬁcially has become a global
2strategy.
As a result of frequent and intensive interventions, many developing countries built
up substantial foreign reserves. In a recent speech, Bernanke (2010) uses the annual
percent change in the real eﬀective exchange rate (REER) as well as the accumulation of
foreign exchange reserves as a share of GDP over the same period to measure the degree
of intervention. He notices that:
“[t]he relationship evident in the graph suggests that the economies that have
most heavily intervened in foreign exchange markets have succeeded in limiting
the appreciation of their currencies. The graph also illustrates that some
emerging market economies have intervened at very high levels and others
relatively little.”
In particular, the chart (Figure 8) in Bernanke (2010) pinpoints Taiwan, Singapore and
Thailand as aggressively trying to hold their currencies down, while India, Chile and
Turkey are not.
The Central Bank of Taiwan have immediately delivered a press brieﬁng to reject
the implication of currency undervaluation in the chart. Oﬃcials from Taiwan’s central
bank have argued that the calculation of the percentage change in the REER could vary
substantially because of diﬀerent comparison based periods. Moreover, they also argue
that REER is not a good measure of undervaluation. Finally, they claim that the changes
in foreign reserves are not necessary caused by oﬃcial intervention. Taiwan’s central bank
concludes in the press release that
[a] better clue to whether a country has intervened in the foreign exchange
market can be found by looking at the growth rate of foreign exchange re-
serves. Taiwan’s FX reserves grew by only 0.8% month-on-month in October
32010, and by a somewhat higher rate of 2.27% in September 2010. These
changes can be mainly explained by the appreciation of the Euro and other
reserve currencies against the U.S. dollar. The data show that Taiwan did not
intervene in the foreign exchange market to prevent appreciation of the NT
dollar.1
Indeed, simple descriptive statistics are not up to the task of sorting out the degree of
oﬃcial intervention, but data unavailability makes it diﬃcult for researchers to investigate
oﬃcial intervention in the foreign exchange market. Weymark (1995, 1997) proposed an
alternative approach to measurement of the degree of exchange market intervention in a
small open economy. By constructing an index of intervention activity that is based on
observed data, Weymark (1995, 1997) used the index to measure bilateral and multilateral
interventions for Canada over the period 1975–1990. However, Chen and Taketa (2007)
use Japanese intervention data to show that the correlation between the Weymark index
and Japanese intervention activity is negative, which casts a doubt on the usefulness of
the Weymark index.
In this paper, we take a further step to investigate and measure the degree of central
bank intervention in the foreign exchange market using a structural vector autoregressive
(SVAR) framework linking the dynamics of exchange rates and foreign reserves. The
SVAR approach has been employed in Kim (2003); however, the goal of Kim (2003) is
to analyze the eﬀects of foreign exchange intervention and monetary policy on the ex-
change rate movements, while the current paper aims at examining how the exchange
rate movements aﬀect the changes in foreign reserves, and measuring the degree of for-
eign exchange intervention. Moreover, a closely related paper by Kim et al. (2009) uses
a bivariate SVAR model with sign restrictions to examine the de facto exchange rate ar-
1See the Cental Bank’s Press Release No. 227 on November 20, 2010.
4rangement in eight East Asian countries, and evaluate the “fear of ﬂoating” hypothesis in
the aftermath of the Asian crisis. Using dynamic policy reaction functions, they measure
the degree of exchange rate stabilization by computing the percentage decrease of foreign
exchange reserves in reaction to an 1% currency depreciation. That is, Kim et al. (2009)
focus on how the exchange rate movements “pass-through” into foreign reserve changes
(conditional on exchange rate shocks) using impulse response functions. In the current
paper, we use variance decomposition as an alternative strategy to measure the degree of
central bank intervention.
Using structural VAR models, we compute the proportional contribution of exchange
rate shocks to the forecast error variance of foreign reserves. Given that central bank
actively intervene the foreign exchange market, the exchange rate movements would be
small, whereas the changes in foreign exchange reserves would be large. If the exogenous
exchange rate shock is able to explain a large portion of the movements in foreign reserves,
the evidence would suggest a high degree of oﬃcial intervention.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the empirical strategy. Section
3 describes the data and preliminary test results, and Section 4 reports the key empirical
results with robustness checks. Finally, concluding remarks are oﬀered in Section 6.
2 Empirical Strategy
We consider the following trivariate VAR model including output growth, ∆log(yt),
changes in real exchange rates, ∆log(EXt), and changes in foreign reserves, ∆log(FRt):
Φ(L)xt = εt, (1)
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Φ(L) = I −Φ1L−Φ2L2 −⋯−ΦpLp is the lag polynomial.
To measure the degree of central bank intervention in the foreign exchange market,
we perform the variance decomposition by the following identiﬁcation:
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where εjt denote the reduced-form VAR innovations. The structural shocks are identiﬁed
as the output shock, eA
t , the exchange rate shock, eEX
t , and the foreign reserve shock,
eFR
t . The identiﬁcation suggests that in order to stabilize the exchange rate, a shock
to exchange rates aﬀects foreign reserves since central bank would buy and sell foreign
exchange reserves in foreign exchange market in response to exchange rate movements.
Moreover, a shock to foreign reserves shifts demand and supply in the foreign exchange
market, which would aﬀect the exchange rate. Clearly, the identiﬁcation scheme allows
exchange rates and foreign reserves to be determined simultaneously. Finally, it is as-
sumed that the output shocks (including demand and supply shocks) move the exchange
rate via adjustments in current account. It is worthy noting that the the foreign exchange
reserve included in the SVAR system is not served as a proxy of foreign exchange mar-
ket intervention, and thus it is not the focus of the current paper to examine how the
exchange rate changes in response to oﬃcial intervention activities. By contrast, if the
evidence shows that a large portion of variance in foreign exchange reserves is attributed
to exchange rate shocks, we interpret it as evidence of currency manipulation.
6We will employ variance decompositions, which help us to investigate the sources of
foreign exchange reserve ﬂuctuations and, in particular, the roles of exchange rate shocks.
Hence, the degree of intervention can be measured through the portion of the movements
in foreign reserves that can be explained by the exchange rate shocks.
3 Data and Preliminary Tests
We investigate monthly data from 1999:M1 to 2010:M9 for emerging countries exam-
ined in Bernanke (2010) : Brazil, Chile, India, Indonesia, Korea, Mexico, Philippines,
Poland, Russia, Singapore, Thailand, Taiwan, and Turkey.2 The sample period is chosen
to be the aftermath of the Asia 1997 currency crisis. We use the growth rate of the
industrial production as the measure of real output growth. Data for the U.S. dollar
nominal exchange rate, foreign exchange reserve and consumer price indices are from the
International Financial Statistics (IFS) published by the International Monetary Fund.
Industrial production for most countries is also from the IFS. Due to missing data problem
in IFS, the industrial production for Indonesia, Russia, and Thailand is obtained from
Datastream. Finally, data for Taiwan are obtained from Taiwan Economic Data Cen-
ter (TEDC). Country real exchange rates are constructed by multiplying the U.S. dollar
nominal exchange rate by the ratio of foreign to U.S. consumer price indices.
Unit root tests are used to examine whether the series for real exchange rate changes,
foreign reserve changes and real output growth are stationary. We apply conventional
unit root tests, including the Augmented Dickey–Fuller (ADF) test, and the Phillips–
2China and Malaysia are excluded in our study because these countries peg their currency to the U.S.
dollar during most of the sample period. Because of unavailability of manufacturing production data in
monthly frequency, Hong Kong is also excluded.
7Perron (PP) test. The results from unit root tests incorporating an intercept in Table 1
suggest that a unit root process is rejected for each series in ﬁrst diﬀerence: ∆log(EX),
∆log(FR) and ∆log(IP).
4 Empirical Results
We use variance decomposition to measure the degree of central bank intervention in the
foreign exchange market. The idea is simple and intuitive: if the central bank intervenes
the exchange market to stabilize its currency, the exchange rate shock should explain a
large portion of the foreign reserve movements. However, if foreign exchange reserves
do not change much, a high contribution of exchange rate shocks does not imply a huge
manipulation. The data for percentage changes in foreign reserves month to month are
plotted in Figure 1. It is clear that the foreign reserves ﬂuctuate considerably for emerging
countries examined in this paper.
In order to investigate how much ﬂuctuations in the foreign reserves are due to dif-
ferent structural shocks, we calculate variance decompositions of the change in foreign
reserves, ∆log(FR), and report the results in Tables 2 and 3. Each column represents
how much of the h-step ahead forecast error variance of the change in foreign reserves
can be explained by the productivity shock (eA), the exchange rate shock (eEX), and the
foreign reserve shock (eFR) for one month, two months, half year, one year, and two years
(h = 1,2,6,12, and 24). It is worth noting that for ﬁve of thirteen emerging countries,
exchange rate shocks are the main source of ﬂuctuations in foreign reserves over all time
horizons. These highly intervened countries are India (79.72–83.94%), Indonesia (40.57–
40.82%), Korea (43.97–54.66%), Philippines (45.14–47.94%), Singapore (74.79–80.83%),
and Taiwan (47.86–54.70%). By contrast, the degree of intervention is relatively lower for
8countries with the smaller contribution of the exchange rate shock: Brazil (0.43–5.85%),
Chile (0.79–0.80%), Mexico (0.28–0.92%), and Russia (0.01–0.26%).
5 Robustness
To check the robustness of the empirical results, we ﬁrst use an alternative measure of
real exchange rates. The real eﬀective exchange rate indices for a total of 58 economies
are obtained from the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). The results in Tables 4
and 5 are consistent with our main ﬁndings.
We then examine diﬀerent VAR identiﬁcation schemes. The ﬁrst alternative identiﬁ-
cation scheme is
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That is, it is assumed that a shock to productivity causes changes in foreign reserves
since the reserves may vary over the economic ﬂuctuations. To be more precise, a positive
productivity shock raises output and export growth, and thus induces an accumulation
of foreign reserve. Moreover, we consider a simple Choleski decomposition as follows:
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. (5)
The results for equation (4) are reported in Tables 6 and 7 whereas results for equation
(5) are reported in Tables 8 and 9. We can see that Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan remain
the countries with relatively higher degree of oﬃcial intervention while lower degree of
intervention is still found in countries such as Brazil, Chile, India, Mexico, and Russia.
96 Conclusion
Due to the lack of appropriate data on oﬃcial intervention in the foreign exchange markets,
it is a diﬃcult task for both academic researchers and policy makers to verify whether
countries let their exchange rate adjust freely as they claimed. The controversy is apparent
particularly for emerging market countries since it is believed in general that in order
to prevent their competitiveness from deteriorating, emerging market countries tend to
frequently and substantially intervene in foreign exchange markets to prevent or slow the
appreciation of their currencies. However, simple descriptive statistics such as the rate of
depreciation in real eﬀective exchange rate or growth rate of foreign reserve accumulation
may fail to capture the whole dynamic picture of oﬃcial intervention.
In this paper, we examine the degree of central bank intervention in the foreign ex-
change markets of thirteen emerging countries using a structural vector autoregressive
(SVAR) framework to link the dynamics of exchange rates and foreign reserves. It is
found that for Korea, Philippines, Poland, Singapore, and Taiwan, exchange rate shocks
play an important role to explain the ﬂuctuations in foreign reserves over all time hori-
zons. Empirical evidence suggests that these countries intervene substantially in the
foreign exchange markets.
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11Table 1: Unit Root Tests
ADF Test PP Test
∆log(EX) ∆log(FR) ∆log(IP) ∆log(EX) ∆log(FR) ∆log(IP)
Brazil -5.83 -3.09 -10.46 -12.09 -12.45 -10.50
Chile -8.55 -6.43 -12.63 -9.98 -13.65 -21.66
India -3.43 -4.58 -18.53 -10.31 -8.70 -18.60
Indonesia -3.29 -7.70 -4.64 -12.24 -11.02 -29.92
Korea -12.24 -3.41 -10.95 -12.34 -7.25 -11.03
Mexico -10.97 -11.79 -12.47 -11.03 -11.88 -12.56
Philippines -11.16 -6.07 -16.24 -11.29 -10.76 -17.46
Poland -10.19 -4.94 -3.00 -10.26 -12.15 -24.20
Russia -4.49 -3.89 -13.19 -8.61 -6.37 -13.21
Singapore -11.80 -5.65 -14.46 -11.89 -11.07 -22.08
Taiwan -8.60 -6.16 -17.94 -10.61 -6.23 -17.53
Thailand -2.91 -2.44 -5.38 -10.81 -9.52 -13.75
Turkey -10.44 -4.88 -4.30 -10.47 -12.90 -21.94
Note: ADF and PP are Augmented Dickey–Fuller and Phillips–Perron test statistics, respec-
tively. In each test, the null hypothesis is that the series has a unit root. Test critical values
for ADF and PP are -3.44 (1%), -2.87 (5%) and -2.57 (10%). Lags in ADF tests are chosen by
Akaike Information Criterion. The variables EX, FR, and IP represent real exchange rates,
foreign reserves, and industrial production, respectively.
12Table 2: Variance Decompositions (Identiﬁcation in Equation (3))
Brazil Chile India
Horizon eA eEX eFR eA eEX eFR eA eEX eFR
1 0.00 0.43 99.58 0.00 0.79 99.21 0.00 83.94 16.06
2 0.00 5.82 94.19 0.04 0.80 99.16 0.06 80.43 19.51
6 0.02 5.85 94.13 0.06 0.80 99.13 0.10 79.72 20.18
12 0.02 5.85 94.13 0.06 0.80 99.13 0.10 79.72 20.18
24 0.02 5.85 94.13 0.06 0.80 99.13 0.10 79.72 20.18
Indonesia Korea Mexico
Horizon eA eEX eFR eA eEX eFR eA eEX eFR
1 0.00 40.57 59.43 0.00 43.97 56.03 0.00 0.28 99.72
2 0.22 40.82 58.96 0.57 54.66 44.77 0.00 0.92 99.08
6 0.31 40.82 58.87 3.02 51.97 45.01 0.04 0.92 99.04
12 0.32 40.82 58.87 3.11 51.41 45.48 0.04 0.92 99.04
24 0.32 40.82 58.87 3.11 51.39 45.50 0.04 0.92 99.04
Philippines Poland Russia
Horizon eA eEX eFR eA eEX eFR eA eEX eFR
1 0.00 45.14 54.86 0.00 17.84 82.16 0.00 0.01 99.99
2 0.06 47.85 52.09 0.10 19.13 80.77 0.29 0.11 99.60
6 0.06 47.94 52.00 2.29 20.06 77.65 0.35 0.26 99.39
12 0.06 47.94 52.00 3.34 19.86 76.80 0.35 0.26 99.39
24 0.06 47.94 52.00 3.37 19.86 76.77 0.35 0.26 99.39
13Table 3: Variance Decompositions (Identiﬁcation in Equation (3))
Singapore Taiwan
Horizon eA eEX eFR eA eEX eFR
1 0.00 80.83 19.17 0.00 54.70 45.30
2 0.24 80.59 19.17 0.00 54.53 45.47
6 0.24 74.79 24.97 1.06 48.08 50.85
12 0.24 74.79 24.97 1.06 47.87 51.07
24 0.24 74.79 24.97 1.06 47.86 51.08
Thailand Turkey
Horizon eA eEX eFR eA eEX eFR
1 0.00 25.57 74.43 0.00 49.70 50.31
2 0.76 29.37 69.87 0.92 44.95 54.14
6 0.78 29.83 69.40 0.95 43.19 55.86
12 0.78 29.83 69.40 0.95 43.18 55.87
24 0.78 29.83 69.40 0.95 43.18 55.87
14Table 4: Variance Decompositions (BIS eﬀective exchange rate indices)
Brazil Chile India
Horizon eA eEX eFR eA eEX eFR eA eEX eFR
1 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 92.19 7.81 0.00 36.16 63.84
2 0.00 0.42 99.58 0.10 92.21 7.69 0.07 41.89 58.04
6 0.00 0.43 99.57 0.31 91.71 7.98 0.07 42.56 57.36
12 0.00 0.43 99.57 0.31 91.71 7.98 0.07 42.56 57.36
24 0.00 0.43 99.57 0.31 91.71 7.98 0.07 42.56 57.36
Indonesia Korea Mexico
Horizon eA eEX eFR eA eEX eFR eA eEX eFR
1 0.00 96.41 3.59 0.00 71.04 28.97 0.00 30.13 69.87
2 0.25 96.18 3.57 0.38 62.24 37.38 0.00 30.14 69.86
6 0.35 96.06 3.59 4.01 62.40 33.59 0.00 30.14 69.86
12 0.36 96.06 3.59 3.99 62.73 33.28 0.00 30.14 69.86
24 0.36 96.06 3.59 4.00 62.72 33.28 0.00 30.14 69.86
Philippines Poland Russia
Horizon eA eEX eFR eA eEX eFR eA eEX eFR
1 0.00 14.27 85.73 0.00 5.86 94.14 0.00 3.26 96.75
2 0.19 15.50 84.30 0.04 6.74 93.23 0.23 2.45 97.32
6 0.53 17.02 82.45 2.43 6.50 91.07 0.30 2.42 97.29
12 0.53 17.02 82.45 3.07 6.46 90.46 0.30 2.42 97.29
24 0.53 17.02 82.45 3.11 6.46 90.43 0.30 2.42 97.29
15Table 5: Variance Decompositions (BIS eﬀective exchange rate indices)
Singapore Taiwan
Horizon eA eEX eFR eA eEX eFR
1 0.00 93.67 6.34 0.00 38.78 61.22
2 0.16 92.41 7.43 0.01 39.49 60.50
6 0.18 91.54 8.29 1.11 47.59 51.30
12 0.18 91.53 8.30 1.12 47.72 51.16
24 0.18 91.53 8.30 1.12 47.72 51.16
Thailand Turkey
Horizon eA eEX eFR eA eEX eFR
1 0.00 43.95 56.05 0.00 5.66 94.34
2 0.72 43.39 55.89 0.70 5.56 93.74
6 0.72 43.24 56.04 0.76 5.49 93.76
12 0.72 43.24 56.04 0.76 5.49 93.75
24 0.72 43.24 56.04 0.76 5.49 93.75
16Table 6: Variance Decompositions (Identiﬁcation in Equation (4))
Brazil Chile India
Horizon eA eEX eFR eA eEX eFR eA eEX eFR
1 0.05 8.00 91.95 0.21 11.68 88.11 0.51 14.38 85.11
2 0.08 13.14 86.78 0.27 11.68 88.05 0.65 12.79 86.57
6 0.12 13.16 86.72 0.29 11.68 88.03 0.72 12.75 86.54
12 0.12 13.16 86.72 0.29 11.68 88.03 0.72 12.75 86.54
24 0.12 13.16 86.72 0.29 11.68 88.03 0.72 12.75 86.54
Indonesia Korea Mexico
Horizon eA eEX eFR eA eEX eFR eA eEX eFR
1 0.25 8.43 91.33 4.14 48.05 47.81 0.48 0.47 99.05
2 0.51 8.76 90.73 3.26 58.55 38.20 0.48 0.79 98.73
6 0.62 8.77 90.62 7.65 52.82 39.53 0.50 0.80 98.70
12 0.62 8.77 90.61 7.52 52.22 40.26 0.50 0.80 98.70
24 0.62 8.77 90.61 7.52 52.20 40.28 0.50 0.80 98.70
Philippines Poland Russia
Horizon eA eEX eFR eA eEX eFR eA eEX eFR
1 1.18 7.92 90.90 4.77 24.59 70.65 0.62 4.05 95.33
2 1.20 9.41 89.39 4.62 25.46 69.92 1.32 3.96 94.72
6 1.20 9.41 89.39 6.54 25.76 67.71 1.43 4.08 94.49
12 1.20 9.41 89.39 7.52 25.50 66.99 1.44 4.08 94.49
24 1.20 9.41 89.39 7.55 25.49 66.96 1.44 4.08 94.49
17Table 7: Variance Decompositions (Identiﬁcation in Equation (4))
Singapore Taiwan
Horizon eA eEX eFR eA eEX eFR
1 2.85 41.44 55.71 0.11 10.40 89.49
2 3.07 41.19 55.74 0.22 9.65 90.13
6 3.01 39.70 57.30 1.84 10.15 88.00
12 3.01 39.70 57.29 1.86 10.25 87.89
24 3.01 39.70 57.29 1.86 10.25 87.89
Thailand Turkey
Horizon eA eEX eFR eA eEX eFR
1 0.56 0.01 99.43 0.52 0.03 99.46
2 0.99 1.54 97.48 0.70 8.74 90.57
6 0.99 1.77 97.23 0.65 9.35 90.00
12 0.99 1.77 97.23 0.65 9.35 90.00
24 0.99 1.77 97.23 0.65 9.35 90.00
18Table 8: Variance Decompositions (Identiﬁcation in Equation (5))
Brazil Chile India
Horizon eA eEX eFR eA eEX eFR eA eEX eFR
1 0.02 0.00 99.98 0.30 1.61 98.09 0.79 4.35 94.86
2 0.02 5.29 94.69 0.36 1.63 98.01 0.98 6.94 92.08
6 0.04 5.33 94.63 0.39 1.63 97.99 1.04 7.53 91.43
12 0.04 5.33 94.63 0.39 1.63 97.99 1.04 7.53 91.43
24 0.04 5.33 94.63 0.39 1.63 97.99 1.04 7.53 91.43
Indonesia Korea Mexico
Horizon eA eEX eFR eA eEX eFR eA eEX eFR
1 0.12 12.20 87.68 3.44 17.59 78.98 0.43 5.87 93.70
2 0.36 12.52 87.12 2.69 29.93 67.38 0.42 6.41 93.17
6 0.46 12.54 87.00 6.75 27.97 65.28 0.46 6.41 93.13
12 0.46 12.54 87.00 6.65 27.60 65.74 0.46 6.41 93.13
24 0.46 12.54 87.00 6.65 27.59 65.76 0.46 6.41 93.13
Philippines Poland Russia
Horizon eA eEX eFR eA eEX eFR eA eEX eFR
1 1.23 3.80 94.97 4.20 16.02 79.78 0.05 12.12 87.83
2 1.32 7.65 91.04 4.08 17.46 78.45 0.45 11.29 88.26
6 1.32 7.75 90.93 6.00 18.52 75.49 0.54 10.78 88.68
12 1.32 7.75 90.93 6.99 18.34 74.67 0.54 10.77 88.69
24 1.32 7.75 90.93 7.02 18.34 74.64 0.54 10.77 88.69
19Table 9: Variance Decompositions (Identiﬁcation in Equation (5))
Singapore Taiwan
Horizon eA eEX eFR eA eEX eFR
1 3.10 44.92 51.97 0.05 16.12 83.83
2 3.41 45.22 51.37 0.05 16.00 83.96
6 3.22 43.69 53.09 1.20 13.47 85.33
12 3.22 43.69 53.09 1.20 13.37 85.44
24 3.22 43.69 53.09 1.20 13.37 85.44
Thailand Turkey
Horizon eA eEX eFR eA eEX eFR
1 0.71 23.39 75.90 0.97 1.50 97.53
2 1.07 27.29 71.64 1.51 7.64 90.85
6 1.06 27.76 71.18 1.46 7.49 91.05
12 1.06 27.76 71.18 1.46 7.49 91.05
24 1.06 27.76 71.18 1.46 7.49 91.05
20Figure 1: Percentage Changes in Foreign Reserves
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